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INTRODUCTION
Efforts to prevent the proliferation of bio-
logical weapons or bioterrorism face an
increasingly complicated landscape char-
acterized by rapid scientific and techno-
logical progress, growing global diffusion
of research capacity, and an array of stake-
holders with important potential roles. In
2002, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) introduced the concept
of a “web of prevention” to underscore
the need for a comprehensive and coordi-
nated strategy that could engage gather the
many communities necessary to address
the challenges (1). The scientific commu-
nity, broadly defined to encompass the
many fields beyond biology that now make
up the life sciences research enterprise, is
recognized as essential to the success of
any strategy. This is particularly true for
addressing what has come to be called“dual
use” research, which is undertaken for ben-
eficial purposes but has the potential to be
misused to cause deliberate harm (2–5).
Programs for “scientific engagement” have
expanded in the last decade to reflect this
recognition and policy attention.
APPROACHES TO ENGAGEMENT:
FRAMING THE ISSUES
Approaches to engaging scientists in biose-
curity issues generally follow one of two
approaches. The traditional framing starts
with requirements, the legal obligations to
which scientists are subject, broadly under
international treaties as well as specifically
under the national laws and regulations
that either implement the agreements or
are undertaken independently by countries
for their own security purposes (6). In cases
such as the European Union, scientists may
also be subject to a significant regional reg-
ulatory framework. It should be no surprise
that the natural inclination for those in the
security and law enforcement communi-
ties, as well as for the diplomats who tend
the treaties, is to begin with one’s legal
obligations, what a scientist “must” do.
An alternative framing that appears to
be gaining momentum treats biosecurity
within the broader context of the social
responsibility of science as another exam-
ple of the responsibilities that scientists
are expected to fulfill. Science is not con-
ducted in a social vacuum and scientists
are subject to the effects of many broader
forces (7). Among them, changing social
attitudes clearly affect how science is car-
ried out1. What scientists “should” do thus
comes from norms of professional behav-
ior as much, or in some cases perhaps
more, as from legal requirements (8). It also
allows scientific engagement on biosecu-
rity to take advantage of the international
attention to issues of research integrity
and responsible conduct of science. This
growing attention reflects the need for
common understandings as the life sci-
ences have become an increasing global
enterprise2. High-level declarations and
statements have underscored the ethical
imperative that along with the fundamen-
tal principles of freedom in the conduct of
science come responsibilities and the need
to maintain public trust3.
An example of nesting security within
the broader framing comes from a project
of the InterAcademy Council (IAC) and
IAP – The Global Network of Science
Academies4. In its first phase, an interna-
tional committee formed by the IAC and
IAP produced a short policy report on
research integrity (9). The report addresses
a broad range of issues, including secu-
rity. The report notes, for example, that
Science and other forms of scholarship
have been incredibly productive by seeking
knowledge unfettered by tradition, ideol-
ogy, and external pressure. At the same
time, research can have a profound influ-
ence on the environment, human health
and well-being, economic development,
national security, and many other facets of
human life. Many areas of science and tech-
nology can be used for destructive as well
as constructive purposes and researchers
have a special responsibility to understand
and address issues of “dual use.” Research
on biological pathogens, for example, poses
1A clear example is the development of standards for the treatment of human subjects in experiments, which developed over time, particularly during the twentieth century
in response to egregious abuses by researchers. The standards for the treatment of laboratory animals have continued to evolve as well.
2For example, the Global Research Council, created in 2012, is a virtual organization comprises national science and engineering funding bodies from about 50 countries that
is devoted to promoting high quality research collaborations, including issues of research integrity. More information is available at http://www.globalresearchcouncil.org/.
3A discussion of these developments may be found in a report from the National Research Council (10).
4IAP is a global network of more than 100 of the World’s Science Academies, launched in 1993. Its primary goal is to help member academies work together to advise
citizens and public officials on the scientific aspects of critical global issues. More information is available at http://www.interacademies.net/. The IAC produces reports
on scientific, technological, and health issues related to the great global challenges of our time to provide knowledge and advice to national governments and international
organizations. More information is available at http://www.interacademycouncil.net/
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both risks and benefits for human health
[Ref. (9): p. 15].
The report then concludes that
“researchers should bear in mind the
possible consequences of their work,
including harmful consequences, in plan-
ning research projects” [Ref. (9): p. 16],
which has clear implications for scientists’
roles in addressing dual use issues.
CONCLUSION
The two approaches to framing scien-
tific engagement on biosecurity are not
mutually exclusive. Many laws reflect social
norms and science engagement programs
using a framework of responsible science
include discussions of laws and regulations,
with the Biological Weapons Convention
as the international legal embodiment of
a fundamental norm against using disease
as a weapon. And much more needs to be
done to decide on and develop the appro-
priate mix of legal, regulatory, and policy
measures to address the security challenges
posed by globalizing science. The issue is
where to begin and what works best to
reach one group of essential stakeholders.
Responsible conduct offers a foundation
on which one can build and complements
more detailed attention to security issues
and legal requirements needed by those in
certain areas of research. It can also con-
tribute to making scientists part of the solu-
tion to biosecurity challenges rather than
part of the problem.
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